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The Social Psychology of Moral Judgment:

An Empirical Study of Social Influence and Intergroup Dynamics

BY

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A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Claremont Graduate University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate Faculty of Social Psychology

Claremont, California
2001

Approved by:

_____

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We, the undersigned, certify that we have read this dissertation and approve it as
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Abstract of the Dissertation

The Social Psychology of Moral Judgment:

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Morality plays an important role in social life. However, very little social psychological research has been dedicated to the examination of perceptions of morality and moral judgment. This dissertation research examines the social psychology of moral judgment in a series of five empirical experiments.

The first two experiments empirically tested the situational factors influencing perceptions of morality. In the first experiment, consequences (negative vs. positive) were predicted (and found) to influence whether a behavior is categorized as a moral infraction. The same behavior resulting in negative consequences received more moral disapproval than when it resulted in positive consequences. In the second experiment, social norms were predicted (and found) to influence abstract or general moral beliefs. Participants aligned their moral beliefs with the majority of their peers. Results also suggest that individuals maintain cognitive distinctions between general, abstract moral beliefs and the specific application of these beliefs. The manipulation resulting in change in moral beliefs did not affect judgments regarding specific behaviors, and manipulating moral disapproval of specific behavior did not significantly

affect general moral beliefs, further informing theoretical research examining lack of consistency between moral ideals and behavior.

Experiments 3 through 5 tested the role of morality in intergroup dynamics. Experiment 3 tested the prediction that individuals will be less likely to morally condemn or derogate an ingroup member than an outgroup member. Experiment 4 was tested the extent to which individuals use morality to maintain ingroup superiority and distinctiveness from outgroups, and Experiment 5 tested the prediction that moral derogation is used to discredit alternative viewpoints to one's own. The results of Experiments 3 through 5 were not consistent with predictions. In Experiment 3, the three-way interaction was opposite to that predicted. Moral derogation was directed more towards an ingroup member offending an outgroup member. Experiment 4 and 5's analyses were non-significant. Potential explanations for these outcomes are discussed. While it is difficult to draw conclusions from Experiments 3 through 5, the results suggest preliminary support for the role of morality in intragroup dynamics. Moral judgment may be used to influence ingroup members to conform to norms and expectations.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Morality plays an important role in social life. Its influence is seen in institutions such as religion and politics and throughout societies worldwide. However, very little social psychological research has been dedicated to the examination of morality. Moral thought pervades daily life affecting individuals' positions on topics such as abortion, the death penalty, and homosexuality. Moral decisions also affect more mundane decisions such as whether to tell a friend a white lie about how great a new hair cut looks. In addition, the study of moral thought has clear implications for understanding societal problems such as crime and juvenile delinquency. At the same time, it is not as clear how social influence affects perceptions of morality. When faced with a situation requiring a moral determination or judgment, there are various situational factors that may influence the conclusion. While many developmental psychologists have studied moral development (e.g., Kohlberg, 1958, 1968; Piaget, 1932/1962), a number of topics relevant to social psychological research, for example, moral attitudes and beliefs, moral judgment, and the role of morality in intergroup dynamics, remain under-researched. This dissertation reports research intending to fill this void by examining the social psychology of morality.

This research includes two series of experiments. The first series is comprised of two experiments designed to test sources of situational influence on perceptions of morality: the role of consequences in discerning the morality of

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a particular behavior and the role of social norms in influencing general moral beliefs.

Piaget (1932/1962) conducted some of the earliest research on the psychology of morality. According to his theory of development in The Moral Judgment of the Child, children progress from moral dependency towards moral autonomy. At the earliest stage, children rely on authority figures to morally inform them, and then as they develop, they begin to make their own autonomous moral judgments. Piaget theorized that over the course of moral development, children change in regards to the degree to which they cognitively attend to others' intentions while making moral judgments. Children at the earliest stages decide whether a child has been "naughty" based entirely on the situational consequences of the behavior. The more bottles broken, the "naughtier" a child is judged. More advanced children will begin to take into consideration the child's intentions. Specifically, were the consequences accidental or intentional? Did the child mean to break the bottles?

While the role of consequences in moral determination is suggested by research in developmental psychology, the role of social norms in moral judgment can be deduced from social learning theory and sociocultural perspectives. According to social learning theory (Bandura, 1969, 1977; Mischel, 1973), modeling and reinforcement are key processes by which morality is learned. Sociocultural perspectives attribute the transmission and maintenance of morals to social and cultural factors. Examples of these theories are dialectic materialistic theory (Baumrind, 1978) and socioanalytic theory (Hogan, Johnson,

& Emler, 1978). (For a thorough comparison of these theories, see Kurtines, Alvarez, and Azmitia, [1990].) Dialectic materialistic theory describes the construction of morals as a function of the interaction between the individual and the society, and socioanalytic theory uses evolutionary theory to suggest that cultures have adopted those morals which facilitate social living and, consequently, reproductive success. What these theories have in common is that they suggest that morals are subject to social and cultural processes just as other norms, customs, and mores.

These diverse perspectives on morality all agree that situational factors influence moral thought. Within the context of moral development, Piaget's (1932/1962) theory suggested that moral development was a function of the presence of an underlying cognitive structure and interaction with the environment. Similarly, Kohlberg (1968/1980) charged teachers and educators with the role of creating an environment in which children can develop. Social learning theories (Bandura, 1969) explicitly attribute the learning of morals through conditioning as a response to environmental stimuli. Sociocultural theories are distinct from these other theories in that they give priority to the role of social and cultural factors (cf. Hogan, Johnson, & Emler, 1978; Kurtines, Alvarez, & Azmitia, 1990).

To further explore the role of situational influences on moral judgment as suggested by these diverse perspectives, the first series of experiments examine two potential sources of situational influence. First, the consequences of a behavior were predicted to influence moral discernment or whether a behavior is

categorized as a moral infraction. If a behavior results in negative consequences, individuals should be more likely to categorize the behavior as a moral infraction. Second, social norms are predicted to influence abstract or general moral beliefs. Specifically, individuals' moral beliefs were predicted to be influenced by knowledge of their peers' moral beliefs.

In these experiments, a distinction is made between moral judgment of a specific behavior and abstract or general moral beliefs. It is predicted that consequences will influence moral judgment of a specific moral behavior, such as lying to a specific person in a specific instance, but social norms will influence general beliefs about abstract moral concepts, such as beliefs about the morality of lying, in general.

The second series of experiments was designed to study the role of morality in regard to intergroup dynamics by expanding on Experiment 2 of the first series. Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that moral beliefs are influenced by perceptions of group norms regarding moral beliefs. Individuals are likely to modify their moral beliefs to be more consistent with their peers' moral beliefs. Experiments 3 through 5 build on this research and test the hypothesis that morality plays a central role in managing intergroup relationships. More specifically, these experiments test the hypothesis that moral beliefs are maintained and moral derogation is used to (1) satisfy individuals' motivation for intergroup distinctiveness and (2) demonstrate ingroup superiority.

Series One: Situational Factors Influencing Morality

Research on morality shares a common underlying assumption, namely that moral behaviors and moral values are inherently or intrinsically different from non-moral behaviors or values (Gewirth, 1978; Kohlberg, 1971; Shweder, 1982; Turiel, 1983). Kohlberg (1968/1980) described the intrinsic qualities of moral beliefs in the following terms:

> Unlike judgments of prudence or aesthetics, moral judgments tend
>
> to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and grounded on objective,
>
> impersonal, or ideal grounds. Statements such as "She's really
>
> great! She's beautiful and a good dancer," or "The right way to
>
> make a martini is five-to-one," involve the good and right, but they
>
> are not moral judgments since they lack the characteristics of the
>
> latter. (p. 55)

Research documenting that children differentiate between what is moral and what is merely a social convention seems to support this viewpoint of intrinsic morality. It appears that children perceive moral conventions as inherently or intrinsically different from mere conventions. For example, elementary school age children recognize prohibitions against physically hurting others as moral in nature but rules regarding proper dress as mere conventions (e.g., Turiel, 1983; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995).

The alternative view is that morality is not solely based on intrinsic characteristics of a behavior or a value, but on extrinsic or situational factors, as well. So, while the assumption of intrinsic morality would suggest that lying is

perceived as morally 'bad' simply because it is inherently bad, an additional

extrinsic source of influence would result in the perception of lying as morally

'bad' because of situational factors. These situational factors may be the

negative consequences resulting from lying, a desire to maintain positive

relationships with peers, a desire to appease authority figures, or a number of

other factors. The experiments of Series 1 test two possible sources of

situational influence or social influence in morality.

The Assumption of Intrinsic Morality

Researchers and society in general seem to believe that moral beliefs are

inherently or intrinsically different than other beliefs. Moral prohibitions are

differentiated from mere conventions when individuals judge the prohibitions as

(1) unalterable, (2) objective, and (3) universally applicable. Conversely,

conventions are (1) alterable, (2) subjective, and (3) nongeneralizable (Helwig,

Tisak, & Turiel, 1990; Nucci & Nucci, 1981; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987;

Turiel, 1983). For example, Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1987) compared

American children and adults with Hindu Indian children and adults. Both

samples were given the same list of behaviors, and were asked about the nature

of the rules regarding the behaviors. A behavior was categorized as moral in

nature if the sample said that it should be universally applied and that it would not

be acceptable for the society to change the rule (unalterable).

They found that different cultures disagree on which behaviors should be

universally applied and therefore are moral. For example, the following

behaviors were perceived as moral breeches in the Indian sample: "the day after

his father's death, the eldest son had a haircut and ate chicken," "one of your family members eats beef regularly," and "a widow in your community eats fish two or three times a week" (Table 1.1, p. 40). The Indian sample judged the rules involving these behaviors as those that should be universally applied. The American sample did not judge any of these behaviors as moral breeches, nor did they judge the rules involving these behaviors as those that should be universally applied (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987).

On the one hand, this research suggests that moral beliefs are perceived as intrinsically universally applicable, objective, and unalterable. However, if a behavior's morality was only based on intrinsic qualities of the behavior itself, then those behaviors that are perceived as moral in nature should be the same across cultures. The presence of cultural differences in perceptions of morality suggests that it is not only intrinsic characteristics of the behaviors themselves that determine their moral nature, but factors extrinsic to the behaviors, possibly cultural or religious norms, as well.

Whereas it is true that individuals believe their own personal moral beliefs should be universally applied, there are inconsistencies across individuals regarding which beliefs are moral. Regardless of the believed characteristics of moral beliefs, they are not universally applied. Universal applicability is not always a characteristic inherent to specific moral behaviors or values and does not always act as a cue for individuals to determine which beliefs are moral. Instead, universal applicability may at times be a characteristic imposed extrinsically by moral perceivers.

Extrinsic Factors Affecting Perceptions of Morality

On the one hand, it seems to be commonly accepted that morality is intrinsically based (Helwig, Tisak, & Turiel, 1990), but at the same time, the general public recognizes that extrinsic or situational factors affect perceptions of morality. For example, the general public holds parents, teachers and other adult role models responsible for teaching morals (Kohlberg, 1968/1980). It could be argued that in this sense, morality is not based on intrinsic characteristics of behaviors. Rather, a behavior is moral if an adult says it is.

Previous research has already demonstrated that motivational factors influence perceptions of morality. Both Bandura's (1986, 1990) model of moral disengagement and Batson's (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999) research on moral hypocrisy suggest that individuals are motivated to appear moral while avoiding the cost of actually being moral. Both of these perspectives suggest that moral reasoning is influenced by self-interest, a factor extrinsic to the behavior itself (Crano, 1995, 1997). Bandura (1990) provides an example in which lying within a business setting becomes "strategic misrepresentation." If morality were only intrinsically based, then the act of telling an untruth should not have different moral implications as a function of self-interest.

The present research contributes to these findings by testing whether morality is influenced by extrinsic factors in general and is not limited to self-interest. It was hypothesized that moral reasoning is affected by extrinsic factors in at least two ways. First, extrinsic factors can influence moral discernment, or

whether a behavior is categorized as a moral infraction. In Bandura's (1990) example, telling an untruth was not necessarily categorized as a lie. A self-interest motivation resulted in categorizing the behavior as "strategic misrepresentation" to avoid an immoral self-representation. Second, extrinsic factors can influence more general moral beliefs regarding the general moral value associated with a behavior. Studies by Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1987; also see Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995) demonstrate dramatic differences between what cultures perceive as moral suggesting that morality can be extrinsically influenced.

Structure of Mental Representations of Morality

In addition to simply documenting the influence of situational factors, the empirical demonstration of these influences as independent of one another would suggest that separate mental representations are maintained for specific behaviors as contrasted with more abstract moral beliefs. Bandura (1990) pointed out that individual behaviors are not always consistent with one's moral beliefs. In a paper titled "Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control," Bandura (1990) discusses evidence demonstrating that

"...moral standards do not function as fixed internal regulators of conduct. Self-regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated... As long as self-sanctions override the force of external inducements, behavior is kept in line with personal standards. However, in the face of strong external inducements,

such conflicts are often resolved by selective disengagement." (p. 28)

According to his theory of selective disengagement, individuals are occasionally motivated to avoid making the association between an individual behavior and general moral beliefs. This perspective would suggest that individuals can maintain mental representations of morality regarding a specific behavior independently of mental representations of abstract moral beliefs. Situational factors influencing moral reasoning regarding specific behaviors may not necessarily influence general beliefs, and factors influencing general beliefs may not influence moral judgment regarding specific behaviors.

Within the context of the present experiment, it was predicted that the same situational factors designed to influence moral judgments of a specific behavior would have little influence on general moral beliefs. Likewise, a manipulation of social norms was designed targeting moral principles. It was predicted that this manipulation would influence related moral beliefs rather than a moral judgment of a specific behavior. In the first experiment, the consequences manipulation was predicted to affect the specific behavior resulting in those consequences. A specific instance of lying would be evaluated based on its consequences.

It also was predicted that social norms would affect abstract beliefs about lying in general. In other words, information suggesting that the social norm for lying is that it is never morally acceptable was predicted to influence an individual's moral beliefs to become consistent with this norm. The

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consequences of a specific instance of lying were predicted to influence moral judgment of that specific behavior and not general beliefs about lying, and social norms were predicted to influence general beliefs about lying, not moral judgments of a specific instance of lying.

<u>The Role Of Morality In Intergroup Dynamics</u>

The second series of experiments was designed to test a conceptualization in which moral judgment functions within intergroup dynamics. Specifically, Series 2 examines the role of morality in the management of intergroup dynamics by testing whether morality is used in maintaining (1) intergroup distinctiveness and (2) ingroup superiority. Other researchers and theorists have already alluded to the association between morality and intergroup dynamics. Within the context of terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991), moral beliefs constitute one form of cultural worldviews, and individuals are motivated to maintain their own cultural worldviews often at the expense of alternative worldviews. Terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1986) posits that self-esteem is derived from the maintenance of one's group's worldview. This is similar to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which suggests that individual self-esteem is derived from identification with a positive group identity. In other words, individual self-esteem is maintained by aligning with an ingroup, maintaining the ingroup's worldview, and establishing ingroup superiority by derogating viewpoints other than the ingroup's. To this end, it is hypothesized that moral beliefs and moral

derogation are used to maintain positive distinctiveness between the ingroup and outgroup.

Series 2 specifically examines morality within the context of intergroup dynamics. It is argued that morality serves the function of differentiating groups. In Brewer's (1991, 1993) theory of optimal distinctiveness, individuals have two contrasting motivations both to maintain identification with the group and to maintain individuality. While originally applied to the psychology of individuals, this research also has implications for broader intergroup dynamics. To derive all of the benefits associated with ingroup identification, it is necessary to demarcate the boundaries of the ingroup clearly. This is accomplished by maintaining optimal distinctiveness between various groups. The ingroup identity is defined, in part, by contrasting characteristics of the ingroup with characteristics of the outgroup (Brewer, 1999).

The present research tests the hypothesis that morality serves the function of maintaining intergroup distinctiveness. It is hypothesized that individuals are more likely to apply moral derogation to outgroup members rather than ingroup members (Experiment 3), the application of moral judgment or derogation results in perceptions of distinctiveness between groups' membership (Experiment 4), and moral judgment or derogation is used to maintain superiority of the ingroup (Experiment 5).

As a program of research, these five experiments examine the role of social influence in morality. The first series of experiments examines the way

social influence shapes morality, and the second series of experiments examines

the way morality shapes intergroup dynamics.

CHAPTER TWO

EXPERIMENT ONE:

MORAL DISCERNMENT AND THE CONSIDERATION OF CONSEQUENCES

Research has demonstrated that perceptions of consequences are related to perceptions of moral violations. Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) found that, while there are differences in Brazilian and U.S. adults' and children's perception of what is a moral violation, in both cultures, perceptions of negative social consequences are related with stronger perceived violations. Perceptions regarding whether actions such as cleaning one's toilet with a flag, breaking a promise, and eating a dog are moral violations were correlated with perceptions of the degree to which these actions resulted in negative consequences to others. Similarly, Miller and Bersoff (1992) demonstrated that life-threatening breaches were evaluated as more extreme moral violations than non-life-threatening breaches.

Batson, Klein, Highberger, and Shaw's (1995) research also implicates consequences in moral judgment. They prompted participants to empathize with a woman who was emotionally upset after a romantic disappointment. The participants were then asked to allocate a negative consequences task and a positive consequences task to two individuals (the target of empathy being one). When made aware that the negative consequences would result in greater suffering from those consequences, it was morally appropriate to make a biased task assignment, and the concept of 'justice' was redefined based on the consequences of the assignment. In the empathy condition, participants were

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more likely to assign the disappointed woman to the positive consequences task than make the assignment based on an objective criterion such as a coin toss. When asked about the morality of this decision, there were no differences in perceptions of the morality of the decision for both individuals who had made the assignment based on a coin toss and those who had made the assignment without the coin toss. In other words, those who made a biased task assignment perceived their decision to be as just as those who made the decision based on a more objective criterion (a coin toss). Apparently, participants perceived that it was alright to make a biased task assignment if the consequences justified such a decision.

Self-Serving Bias. One variation on the effects of consequences on moral reasoning would be conditions under which moral reasoning is affected by a self-serving bias. A self-serving bias in this context refers to moral judgments which favor one's self while underemphasizing the consequences to others. McClosky and Brill (1983) demonstrated that individuals' abstract beliefs about freedom of assembly and freedom of speech are inconsistent with their concrete application of these beliefs. It appears that abstract beliefs are applied in a biased manner. Specifically, individuals who were proponents of the freedom of assembly and freedom of speech would deny these rights to Nazis. While they believed in the freedom of assembly and speech, they were in favor of limiting particular groups such as Nazis. Similarly, while individuals will support the rights of consenting adults and their sexual conduct, these rights may not be applied to the concrete instance of homosexuality.

In a study on "The Effect of Alcohol and Social Context on Moral Judgment," Denton and Krebs (1990) concluded "those who faced an imminent decision about driving impaired displayed the weakest convictions about the wrongfulness of impaired driving" (p. 246). Their judgments about whether or not drinking and driving was morally reprehensible were affected by the consequences implied by the social context. In a context in which they were very likely to be driving under the influence, they were biased to be less likely to condemn this behavior than at a future time in an academic setting.

Bandura (1990) concluded that conceptions of morality are influenced and changed to avoid external consequences as well as internal consequences such as moral contradictions between standards and behaviors. These biases result in reconstruing detrimental conduct, obscuring personal agency, disregarding or distorting harmful consequences, and the blaming and dehumanizing of victims. For example, one may reconstrue detrimental conduct through moral justification.

"By appealing to morality, social reformers are able to use coercive, and even violent, tactics to force social change... People who have been socialized to deplore killing as morally condemnable can be rapidly transformed into skilled combatants, who may feel little compunction and even a sense of pride in taking human life in combat." (p. 29)

Euphemistic labeling is used to provide acceptable interpretations. Terrorists become "freedom fighters," civilians dying in a military strike become "collateral

damage," and lying within a business setting becomes "strategic misrepresentation."

Batson and his colleagues (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997) have conducted research on moral hypocrisy demonstrating that individuals are motivated to appear moral while avoiding the cost of actually being moral. In their paradigm, study participants are instructed that they will be responsible for assigning a positive consequences task and a neutral task to either themselves or another study participant. The issue of morality is introduced by explicitly stating that most individuals think the fair way to make the assignments is by using the flip of a coin (Study 2). Nine out of ten participants who flipped a coin assigned themselves to the positive consequences task. This is far from the expected 50% chance one would expect from the flipping of a coin. This result was interpreted in the following terms:

> "With self-interest an issue, flipping the coin introduced enough
> ambiguity into the decision process that participants could feel
> moral while still favoring themselves. (It's heads. Let's see, that
> means...I get the positive task." "It's tails. Let's see, that
> means...the other participant gets the neutral task.")" (p. 1342; also
> cited in Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman,
> 1999).

Participants were able to maintain the belief that they had made the assignment using a fair method and still assure assignment to the positive consequences task.

In another study (Study 3, Batson et al., 1997), participants were told that they could use an assignment made by the experimenter if they wanted. For example, they would be told, "Your participant number is __, an ___ number. Therefore, if you accept the experimenter's assignment, *you* will do the _____ consequences task" (p.1342). Consistent with their moral hypocrisy prediction, participants were more likely to accept the experimenter's assignment when it gave them the positive consequences. Participants maintained positive perceptions of the morality of their decisions without suffering the consequences of missing out on the positive consequences task. This demonstrated that individuals "assume a moral masquerade, to make a show of morality, but only a show" (p. 1336).

In a recent study, Batson et al. (1999) conducted research in support of the hypothesis that the moral hypocrisy effect resulted from a motive of "avoiding the comparison of one's immoral behavior (unfairly assigning oneself to the positive consequences task) with one's moral standards (being fair)" (p. 529). Within the framework of the coin-flipping study, the moral hypocrisy effect disappeared when participants had to make the assignment while facing a mirror. Batson et al. (1999) explained that this self-awareness eliminated the hypocrisy effect by making participants aware of the discrepancy between their behavior and their standards.

The Present Research

In the present experiment, participants were presented with a scenario in which a character lies. Half of the participants read that the lie results in positive

consequences, and half of the participants read that the lie results in negative consequences. It was predicted that participants would report less moral disapproval when the lie resulted in positive consequences than when the same behavior resulted in negative consequences.

This hypothesis was tested within the context of a juvenile hall institution. A common method of studying morality is to compare a sample of juvenile delinquents with juvenile non-delinquents (e.g., Hartshorne & May, 1928-30; Kohlberg, 1958). Experiment 1 is a variant of this method, but juvenile delinquents were compared with juvenile hall staff. While research on morality typically looks for differences between delinquents and non-delinquents, the present experiment hypothesizes that moral perceptions of both the delinquents and juvenile hall staff will be affected by the situational consequences. In other words, whereas much research previously has been concerned with studying differences in moral reasoning processes in delinquent and non-delinquent samples, the hypotheses of the present experiment are predicted to apply to both delinquent and non-delinquent (staff) samples. Rather than focusing on individual differences (as in research on moral development), this research is based on predictions of main effects that will be applicable to general psychological processes in moral reasoning.

Methods

Participants

Participants were recruited from a juvenile hall institution. Of the 80 participants, 43 (54%) were male and female staff and 37 (46%) were male

minors detained in high security units. Minors within the high security units generally have been cited for more serious offenses such as murder, rape, and assault. Participants were invited to participate in a study of moral judgment. They were informed that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions, and that they simply should provide their honest opinion to each of the questions. Participation was completely voluntary. Minors who did not choose to participate were provided with another activity. Without an alternate activity, the juveniles might have thought that they must participate in the research in order to come out of their locked rooms. An alternate activity was provided to avoid perceptions of coercion. All study participants were compensated with a candy bar. Out of the 39 juveniles invited to participate in the study, 95% (37) chose to participate. Out of 40 staff invited to participate, 100% chose to participate.

Design

The design was a 2 (positive vs. negative consequences) X 2 (staff vs. minors) design. There were four dependent variables: moral disapproval of the behavior, moral disapproval of the person doing the lying, moral disapproval of lying in general, and perceptions of whether the behavior described was perceived as a lie.

Materials

Participants read the following passage:

Matt, an employee at a nearby 7-Eleven store, was a victim of a hold up six months ago. He was not hurt, and the thief was found rather quickly. The only people who knew about the hold up

were Matt, the management, and the police. Amazingly, none of the other employees of the 7-Eleven knew anything about the hold up. Over the next month, however, a rumor began to spread that the hold up had occurred. A number of the other employees began to get scared and started talking about quitting. One day a bunch of his co-workers confronted Matt and asked if the hold up had really occurred. Matt decided that it would do more harm than good, so he denied that it had occurred.

In the positive consequences condition, this passage was followed by:

After he told them that, the employees were no longer scared, and they stopped talking about quitting. Over the next few months, business did really well. Management heard about how Matt had handled the situation with his co-workers. They were so impressed with how intelligently he had handled the situation, that soon, he received a promotion to manage the 7-Eleven. And today, business is better than ever.

In the negative consequences condition, the initial passage was followed by:

After he told them that, the employees were no longer scared, and they stopped talking about quitting. However, three months after the first incident, another hold up occurred. This time, another employee, Jake, was the victim, and he was not as fortunate. During the course of the hold up, Jake was shot and

killed. The police said that since the employees had not discussed the previous hold up, he was not prepared.

After they had read the vignette, participants answered questions on 7-point Likert scales designed to elicit moral discernment. Two items ("Would you agree or disagree that Matt did the right thing?" and "Was it alright for Matt to deny the hold up?") were averaged to measure moral discernment of the behavior ($\alpha = .70$), two items ("Would you agree or disagree that Matt is a good person?" and "How good a person is Matt?") were averaged to measure moral judgments regarding Matt, the character in the vignette ($\alpha = .90$), and three items ("Lying is always bad," "There are times when lying is justified," and "People should never lie") were averaged to measure moral beliefs about lying in general ($\alpha = .79$). The items were rescaled so that higher scores indicated moral disapproval of Matt's behavior, moral disapproval of Matt as a person, and moral disapproval of lying in general.

In addition, one final item ("Matt denied that the hold up occurred. Would you consider this a lie?") was included to test whether the behavior was perceived as a lie. This last item was included to safeguard against the alternative explanation that the behavior is perceived as inherently different across the consequences conditions. It was predicted that whether participants perceived the behavior as a lie would not differ as a result of different consequences. In other words, regardless of the consequences, a lie is a lie, but whether the lie is immoral depends on its consequences.

Results

A 2 (positive vs. negative consequences) X 2 (staff vs. minors) analysis

supported the central hypothesis that the consequences of a behavior affect its

perceived morality, F (1, 75) = 9.65, p < .005. Participants in the negative

consequences condition expressed more moral disapproval of the behavior (M =

5.46, $S.D.$ = 1.64) than individuals in the positive consequences condition (M =

4.31, $S.D.$ = 2.02). Employing techniques established by Rosenthal, Rosnow, &

Rubin (2000), the effect size can be estimated as r = .34, and this can be

represented in their binomial effect size display as represented in Table 1. This

table can be constructed to represent the size of an effect and provide

information regarding its practical meaning. As is evident in Table 1, 67% of the

participants in the negative consequences condition reported more than average

moral disapproval in comparison with only 33% of those in the positive

consequences condition.

Table 1.
Binomial Effect Size Display Representing the Relationship Between
Consequences and Moral Disapproval

Condition	Moral Disapproval	
	More than Average	Less than Average
Negative Consequences	67%	33%
Positive Consequences	33%	67%

Note. Effect size estimate: r = .34

There was also a significant main effect for the factor differentiating staff

from the minors, F (1, 75) = 13.61, p < .001. The staff expressed more

disapproval of the behavior (M = 5.55, $S.D.$ = 1.71) than did the minors (M =

4.15, $S.D.$ = 1.88), r = .39. However, there was not a significant interaction, F (1,

75) = 0.77, n.s., indicating that the minors' moral judgments were not more affected by the consequences of the behavior than the staff's.

The consequences did not significantly affect whether this behavior was considered a lie, F (1, 75) = 1.96, n.s., r = .16. This pattern of results is consistent with the explanation that, inherently, a lie can be a lie, but not necessarily immoral. There was a significant main effect for the factor differentiating between staff and minors, though, F (1, 75) = 6.17, p < .05. The staff were more likely to consider the behavior a lie (M = 6.14, S.D. = 1.54) than the minors (M = 5.16, S.D. = 1.99), r = .28.

The consequences manipulation did not have a significant effect on perceptions of the individual's morality, F (1, 75) = 0.48, n.s., r = .08, nor on moral beliefs regarding lying in general, F (1, 75) = 0.04, n.s., r = .02. Staff and minors did not significantly differ in their responses to questions about perceptions of the individual's morality, F (1, 75) = 0.80, n.s., r = .10, nor on general moral beliefs regarding lying, F (1, 75) = 3.07, n.s., r = .20.

Discussion

The primary prediction of this first experiment was that the consequences of a behavior would affect moral discernment. The results supported this prediction. The same behavior resulting in negative consequences was judged as more immoral than when the behavior resulted in positive consequences. In the present experiment, however, general moral beliefs regarding the morality of lying were not affected by the consequences of one specific lie.

Testing these predictions in this context has particular import for research on moral development. Traditionally, theories on moral development (Piaget, 1932/1962; Kohlberg, 1958,1968) have associated the use of consequences or rewards and punishments with deficient moral development. Less developed children are expected to decide whether or not another child has been "naughty" based entirely on the consequences of the behavior. The present experiment is consistent with other research questioning whether the use of consequences in moral judgment is limited to undeveloped children. Karniol (1978) found that older children do not significantly differ from younger children in the use of cues regarding consequences. In the present experiment, the minors were not any more likely to be affected by the consequences than were the staff. This suggests that the use of consequences in determining morality is not necessarily associated with delinquent or deficient moral development.

Of course, it could be argued that juvenile hall staff represent a unique population, and a comparison of juvenile delinquents with juvenile hall staff does not adequately demonstrate these processes in a general population. To address this point, Experiment 2 was conducted on a sample of college students replicating these results.

CHAPTER THREE

EXPERIMENT TWO:

THE INFLUENCE OF MORAL NORMS

Existing evidence for the role of social influence and moral norms in affecting moral beliefs is evident in the documentation of <u>cultural differences</u> in moral beliefs and in the existence of <u>social influence</u> effects.

<u>Cultural Differences</u>

Individuals from different cultures demonstrate differences in perceptions of what is moral and what is merely conventional (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995). For example, Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1987) compared an American with a Hindu Indian sample. The following is a sample of behaviors that were judged as morally wrong by Brahman children and adults: cutting hair and eating chicken after father's death, cooking in clothes worn to defecate, eating beef, ignoring beggar, breaking promise, and destroying another's picture. The Indian sample believed that these behaviors were universally moral in nature. Of course, the list of behaviors judged as morally bad by Americans was very different. These cultural differences, as well as similar findings replicated in other cultures (Edwards, 1987; Smetana, 1995; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995), demonstrate that individuals from different cultures with different norms have different moral beliefs.

Another study (Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993) demonstrated similar findings. Not surprisingly, individuals affiliated with different religious groups had differences in perceptions of morality in regards to the issues of

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abortion and contraception. In this case, different religions come to different moral conclusions. This religious relativism suggests that what an individual in one culture or group perceives as fundamentally and inherently moral is different from what is considered as fundamentally and inherently moral by an individual in another culture or group, and these differences may be associated with group norms. In other words, transmission of moral principles by religious authorities may be similar to the transmission of other customs and beliefs. Just as socialization impacts beliefs about etiquette and norms about social interaction, differences in religious socialization appear to result in different moral principles.

Research on contextualism (Rogoff, 1990) has demonstrated that in different contexts, individuals' moral reactions are different. In some social situations, it is within the expected social norms to psychologically harm another. "Individuals in academic settings may receive criticism – for example, from a publication review committee – that may result in a certain amount of psychological distress to the recipient" (Helwig, 1995, p. 178). Helwig (1995) demonstrated that children make different moral judgments regarding physical and psychological harm to others, and they will also change these judgments based on the rules of a game. In his study, he described a game similar to the duck-duck-goose game in which it was changed to a smart-smart-stupid game. A situation was described in which a child started crying after being called stupid. The dependent variable was whether or not it was alright to call names in the context of the game. A majority (91%) said it was alright to call names in the context of the game, and all but one participant said name calling was not alright

outside of the game context. Helwig (1995) went on to replicate this context effect using adolescents and college undergraduates by demonstrating that there are different contexts in which the freedom of speech and freedom of religion are applicable.

Support for the contextualism hypothesis also comes from cross-cultural research demonstrating that individuals make situation specific differentiations. In many different cultures, individuals differentiate between situations in which it is appropriate to conform to the directions of an authority figure. Individuals also differentiate between situations in which interpersonal considerations take precedence over personal considerations in contrast with situations in which the priority is reversed (Wainryb & Turiel, 1995). Individuals decide whether conformity is an appropriate response based on the context. For example, children will recognize that it is alright for parents to make rules about not lying, but it is not alright for parents to make rules about not showing your feelings (Laupa, Turiel, & Cowan, 1995).

Social Influence

It is possible that moral norms serve the function of social influence; perceptions of group norms will influence individuals' perceptions of morality. There is empirical evidence suggesting that group norms concerning morality are transmitted through social influence processes similar to those involved in the influence of attitudes and opinions (see Petty & Wegener, 1998). Research in the area of minority group persuasion and indirect persuasion has also demonstrated that the same social influence processes that apply to non-moral

attitudes apply to moral attitudes such as abortion, birth control, and homosexuality (Alvaro & Crano, 1997; Mugny & Perez, 1991).

The research demonstrating religious differences and contextual differences suggest that morality may be affected by social norms. Moral norms may be learned and enforced similar to other social norms. Religious authorities may make prescriptions regarding these norms, and individuals within religious groups may use social pressure to enforce or encourage conformity within the group. Likewise, just as norms and etiquette are conditional upon context, the research on contextualism suggests that moral norms are contextually dependent.

This experiment tests the extent to which a manipulation of norms will influence general moral beliefs. If moral beliefs are subject to the same processes as other social norms, then a manipulation of perceptions of moral norms should influence these beliefs.

Methods

Participants

Participants for Experiment 2 were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses. Of the 79 participants, 22 were psychology majors. As in the first experiment, participants were instructed that this research was concerned with studying moral judgment, that there were no right or wrong answers, and that they should provide their honest opinions to each of the questions. Participants received extra-credit for participation. Out of 83 questionnaires distributed to the classes, 95% (79) were returned completed.

<u>Design</u>

The design was a 2 (positive vs. negative consequences) X 2 (moral norm condition) X 2 (whether completed the assigned task) design. The same four dependent variables from Experiment 1 were elicited in this experiment: moral disapproval of the behavior, moral disapproval of the person doing the lying, moral disapproval of lying in general, and perceptions of whether the behavior described was perceived as a lie.

<u>Materials</u>

The materials in this experiment were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with the exception that an additional coversheet was attached to the front of each packet. Each respondent randomly received one of two coversheets communicating opposing moral norms. One coversheet said,

"In a survey earlier this year of students attending [Pomona College or Cal Poly Pomona], <u>91% of your peers said that under certain, specific circumstances lying is morally acceptable</u>. The current study is interested in examining this fact. Please write one paragraph explaining <u>under what circumstances it is morally acceptable to lie</u>."

The alternate coversheet said,

"In a survey earlier this year of students attending [Pomona College or Cal Poly Pomona], <u>91% of your peers said that under no circumstances is lying morally acceptable</u>. The current study is

interested in examining this fact. Please write one paragraph

explaining why lying is never acceptable."

Following the coversheet, respondents received one of the two vignettes

described earlier in which there were either positive or negative consequences

resulting from a lie. Respondents were then asked the same questions from

Experiment 1 regarding moral disapproval of Matt's behavior, moral disapproval

of Matt as a person, and moral disapproval of lying in general.

Coding

As a manipulation check, each participant's response on the coversheet

was coded based on whether they completed the task as assigned. Sixteen

(13.5%) of the respondents did not complete the task as assigned. They either

wrote a paragraph contrary to their assigned conditions or simply stated that they

disagreed with the position they were asked to write about. There were

participants in both conditions manipulating moral norms who failed to complete

the assigned task. There was no evidence to suggest that task completion was

dependent on condition assignment, χ^2 (1) = 2.78, n.s..

Results

The results were analyzed using a 2 (positive vs. negative consequences)

X 2 (moral norm condition) X 2 (whether completed the assigned task) design.

As in the first experiment, there was a significant main effect for the positive vs.

negative consequences manipulation, F (1, 71) = 4.15, p < .05. Negative

consequences (M = 4.09, S.D. = 0.87) resulted in significantly more moral

disapproval of the behavior than in the positive consequences condition ($\underline{M}$ = 3.78, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 1.02), $\underline{r}$ = .23.

For the dependent variable measuring moral disapproval of lying in general, there was a significant interaction between the moral norm condition and whether the assigned task was completed, $\underline{F}$ (1, 71) = 13.07, $\underline{p}$ < .001. When the participants did not complete the assigned task, the manipulation did not work as predicted. Individuals told that the normative belief is that lying is sometimes morally acceptable ($\underline{M}$ = 5.78, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 1.58) expressed significantly more moral disapproval of lying than did individuals in the condition in which they were told that the normative belief is that lying is never morally acceptable ($\underline{M}$ = 2.22, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 1.08), $\underline{t}$ (10) = 4.46, $\underline{p}$ < .01, $\underline{r}$ = .82. It is possible that this result represents a reactance by a minority of participants. These participants may have expressed particularly exaggerated opinions in direct opposition to the position attributed to the majority of their peers. This suggests that one area for future research is examining the conditions under which individuals are not influenced by information regarding moral norms.

However, 86.5% of the participants did complete the task as assigned, and the individuals who did complete the assigned task were affected by the manipulation of moral norms in the predicted direction. Participants told that 91% of their peers believed that lying was never morally acceptable ($\underline{M}$ = 3.85, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 1.71) expressed significantly more moral disapproval of lying than participants told that 91% of their peers believed that lying was sometimes morally acceptable ($\underline{M}$ = 2.96, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 1.58), $\underline{t}$ (63) = 2.17, $\underline{p}$ < .05, $\underline{r}$ = .26. As represented

in a binomial effect size display in Table 2, 63% of participants were more likely to align their moral beliefs with those of their peers.

Table 2.
Binomial Effect Size Display Representing the Relationship Between Moral Norms and Moral Beliefs

Reported Peer Norm	Moral Beliefs	
	Lying is Sometimes Appropriate	Lying is Never Appropriate
Lying is Sometimes Appropriate	63%	37%
Lying is Never Appropriate	37%	63%

Note. Effect size estimate: $r = .26$

The consequences of the lie did not affect moral beliefs regarding lying in general, $F (1, 71) = 0.05$, $p = .83$, $r = .03$. The manipulation of moral norms did not affect moral disapproval of the behavior, $F (1, 71) = 0.10$, $p = .75$, $r = .04$, regardless of whether participants completed the task as assigned, $F (1, 71) = .14$, $p = .71$. Neither manipulation influenced moral disapproval of Matt, the person actually doing the lying in the vignette. Likewise, neither manipulation influenced whether the behavior was considered a lie.

Discussion

This experiment replicated the findings of the first experiment in a college sample. The same behavior resulting in positive consequences received less moral disapproval than if the behavior resulted in negative consequences. In addition, by manipulating information regarding the moral norms of lying, participants' moral beliefs were affected. In each case, participants' beliefs were more likely to be aligned with what they thought their peers believed.

This experiment permits the examination of the distinctions made earlier between moral judgment of specific behaviors and norms regarding general moral beliefs. Bandura (1990) discusses moral disengagement in which individuals disengage their moral standards to permit behavior inconsistent with these standards. This suggests that general moral beliefs and judgment of specific instances may be governed by separate processes or processes that are not always functioning in cooperation with one another. In the present experiment, results support this disjunction. The manipulation of the specific consequences of a behavior affected moral judgment of that specific behavior but did not significantly influence general moral beliefs, and the moral norm manipulation affected general moral beliefs without influencing judgments of the specific behavior.

It should be noted that this research does not suggest that consequences do not ever affect general moral beliefs. In the scenario used here, the consequences were described as the direct result of a very specific behavior, and participants were asked to make moral judgments about that very specific behavior. Likewise, it may be that consequences for more abstract moral beliefs may affect moral beliefs as in McClosky and Brill's (1983) study demonstrating that individuals' abstract beliefs about freedom of assembly and freedom of speech did not apply to Nazis.

Conversely, social norms about specific behaviors may also affect moral judgment of these behaviors. The fact that each of these types of mental moral representations was manipulated separately indicates that associations between

these representations should not be presupposed. While moral reasoning is affected by situational factors such as consequences and social norms, this research does not permit conclusions regarding whether these factors are limited to influencing only behaviors or only abstract, general moral beliefs.

It also is interesting to note that a minority (13.5%) of the respondents chose not to complete the moral norm manipulation as instructed. These respondents either expressed moral beliefs contradictory to the moral norm or seemed to misinterpret the instructions. Those who chose not to complete the manipulation as instructed manifested moral beliefs countering predictions. For example, individuals who read that the moral norm was that lying was never morally acceptable and did not conform to the instructions maintained their moral beliefs and expressed less moral disapproval of lying, in general.

The present experiment does not allow us to draw conclusions about why this occurred. It is possible that these individuals maintain moral principles that are unaffected by moral norms, or it is possible that these participants did not identify with the group for whom the norm was reported. The manipulation reported moral norms for the particular college participants were attending. It may be that participants chose not to conform to the instructions because they more strongly identified with religious groups or other social groups with opposing moral norms. In this case, knowledge about moral norms at the college may have had less influence because moral norms from another group were perceived as having greater authority or influence.

CHAPTER FOUR

EXPERIMENT THREE:

DIFFERENTIAL APPLICATION OF MORAL DEROGATION

IN INTERGROUP DYNAMICS

The first two experiments primarily demonstrate the way in which situational influences affect morality. The second goal of this research is to examine the role of morality in intergroup dynamics. It is argued that moral judgment is used to manage intergroup dynamics by establishing intergroup positive distinctiveness. First, moral judgment may be used to maintain distinctions between the ingroup and outgroup, and second, moral judgment may be used to maintain ingroup superiority. The specific hypotheses are that individuals are more likely to morally derogate or judge outgroup members as morally deficient rather than ingroup members (Experiment 3), the application of moral judgment or derogation results in perceptions of distinctiveness between groups' membership (Experiment 4), and moral judgment or derogation is used to maintain superiority of the ingroup (Experiment 5).

Brewer (1999) argued that groups are motivated to maintain intergroup distinctiveness. Extending this argument, she wrote, "If social differentiation and intergroup boundaries are functional for social cooperation, there should be psychological mechanisms at the individual level that motivate and sustain ingroup identification and differentiation" (p. 434). Experiments 3 through 5 test the possibility that moral judgment serves the function of intergroup differentiation and maintains perceptions of ingroup superiority. Previously, it has been

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demonstrated that individuals are biased to favor their ingroup when allocating scarce resources (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In addition, it has been demonstrated that increased acceptance of stereotypic beliefs and prejudicial attitudes is associated with perceptions of threat to the ingroup superiority (Quist & Resendez, in press). Individuals who perceive their own worldview as threatened experience decreased self-esteem motivating them to re-establish the validity of their worldview (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997).

Experiments 3 through 5 test the prediction that morality and moral derogation are used to maintain perceptions of positive distinctiveness in the ingroup. The 'distinctiveness' part of positive distinctiveness entails differentiating the ingroup from the outgroup. Moral derogation can serve the function of indicating who belongs to the ingroup and who does not. The 'positive' part of positive distinctiveness suggests that morality will be used to maintain ingroup superiority. By morally derogating members of the outgroup, ingroup superiority is established.

In this experiment, the hypothesis that moral judgment is differentially applied to the ingroup versus the outgroup is tested. More specifically, it was hypothesized that individuals would be less likely to morally derogate members of the ingroup rather than members of the outgroup. To test this hypothesis, a new vignette was created in which a businessman lies to make a sale. Both the nationality of the seller and the nationality of the buyer were manipulated to be either American or Arab. There were two hypotheses in this experiment. First, it was predicted that an Arab businessman would be less likely to be perceived as

a member of the ingroup by American college students than an American businessman, and therefore, an Arab businessman who lies was predicted to receive more moral disapproval than an American businessman who lies.

In the second hypothesis, a three-way interaction was predicted. If morality is differentially applied based on group membership, then American college students should express the most moral disapproval in the negative consequences condition when person lying is a member of the outgroup (Arab), and the negative consequences affect an ingroup member (American victim). This prediction is consistent with Ugwuegbu's (1979) research on juror reactions that demonstrated an interaction between juror race, defendant race, and victim race. White jurors rated Black defendants with White victims as most culpable, and Black jurors rated White defendants with Black victims as most culpable. In other words, the most culpability was assigned to outgroup members whose victims were ingroup members.

This is the same pattern predicted in the present experiment: the most moral disapproval is predicted for outgroup members whose victims are ingroup members. If moral judgment plays a role in maintaining positive distinctiveness, then (a) moral judgment should be differentially applied to ingroup vs. outgroup members to indicate distinctiveness, and (b) the bias in moral judgment should favor ingroup members (possibly at the expense of outgroup members) thereby providing the 'positive' part of positive distinctiveness.

Methods

Participants

Research participants consisted of 152 undergraduate students from local colleges in introductory psychology classes. Participants were given extra-credit in class for participation.

Design

This experiment is based on a 2 (negative consequences vs. positive consequences) x 2 (nationality of seller: Arab or American) x 2 (nationality of buyer: Arab or American) design. In addition to the measures introduced in the first experiment (moral derogation of the behavior, moral derogation of the person, and moral derogation of lying in general), three items were used to assess identification with the seller or the lie recipient ($\alpha = .73$), and the same three items were used to assess identification with the buyer or the person doing the lying ($\alpha = .58$).

Materials

The materials and procedure for Experiment 3 were modeled after the procedure used in Experiment 1 but conducted within the context of a different vignette (see Appendix 1). Participants read a scenario in which a businessman attempting to sell a convenience store lies, and the lie results in either positive or negative consequences for the person who bought the business. In addition, the nationality of buyer and seller were manipulated.

Results

There was a significant three-way interaction for three of the dependent variables: moral derogation of the behavior, F (1, 144) = 3.96, p < .05, moral derogation of the person doing the lying, F (1, 144) = 4.19, p < .05, and identification with the lie recipient, F (1, 144) = 5.22, p < .05. The three-way interaction was only marginally significant for the identification with the character doing the lying, F (1, 144) = 3.07, p = .08.

This initial pattern of results was not consistent with hypotheses. First, the measures regarding identification with the buyer and seller were intended to act as a manipulation check for the manipulation of the ethnicity of the buyer and seller. The predicted results in this case should have been for two main effects. However, while all of the means were in the predicted direction, the main effect for the ethnicity of the seller was not significant for identification with the seller, F (1, 144) = 2.53, p = .11, and the main effect for ethnicity of the buyer was only marginally significant for identification with the buyer, F (1, 144) = 3.39, p = .07. Instead, identification with the buyer was dependent on the three-way interaction between the consequences of the lie, the ethnicity of the seller (liar), and the ethnicity of the buyer (lie recipient), F (1, 144) = 5.22, p < .05.

Further examination of the three-way interaction indicated that the nature of the interaction was quite consistent across moral derogation of the behavior, moral derogation of the person, and identification with the lie recipient. When the character lying was an outgroup member, the two-way interaction between the consequences and the ethnicity of the lie recipient was not significant for any of

the dependent variables. In other words, as displayed in Table 1, there was no consistent pattern for an outgroup liar. However, when the character lying was an ingroup member, the two-way interaction was significant for moral derogation of the behavior, F (1, 144) = 8.86, p < .01, moral derogation of the person, F (1, 144) = 5.36, p < .05, and identification with the lie recipient, F (1, 144) = 4.06, p < .05. It appears that participants were harder on an ingroup member who lied than an outgroup member.

An examination of the simple effects (see Table 3) within this two-way interaction indicates that, when the person doing the lying was an ingroup member and the lie recipient was an outgroup member, negative consequences elicited significantly more moral derogation of the behavior (M = 5.36, S.D. = 0.87) than positive consequences (M = 4.52, S.D. = 1.56), F(1, 144) = 4.41, p < .05, negative consequences elicited more moral derogation of the liar (M = 4.28, S.D. = 0.92) than positive consequences (M = 3.46, S.D. = 1.42), F(1, 144) = 4.08, p < .05, and negative consequences elicited more identification with the lie recipient (M = 5.36, S.D. = 0.87) than positive consequences (M = 3.76, S.D. = .91), F(1, 144) = 4.41, p < .05.

Table 3.
Multivariate Three-Way Interaction Between Ethnicity of the Liar, Ethnicity of the
Lie Recipient, and Consequences

Consequences	Lie Recipient	Derogation of Person		Derogation of Behavior		Identification with Recipient	
		M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Ingroup Liar							
Positive	Ingroup	4.08	1.06	5.59	0.67	4.47	1.39
	Outgroup	3.46	1.42	4.52	1.56	3.76	0.91
Negative	Ingroup	3.63	1.38	4.97	1.03	4.39	1.45
	Outgroup	4.28	0.92	5.36	0.87	4.74	0.76
Outgroup Liar							
Positive	Ingroup	3.28	1.22	4.98	1.29	4.40	1.32
	Outgroup	3.59	1.45	5.19	1.07	4.22	1.25
Negative	Ingroup	3.88	1.52	5.11	1.05	5.12	0.93
	Outgroup	3.69	1.51	5.30	1.35	4.18	1.62

There were no significant differences in derogation of the liar or identification with the lie recipient between the positive and negative consequences conditions when the lie recipient was an ingroup member. This effect was not significant for moral derogation of the person, $F(1, 144) = 1.36$, $p = .25$, or for identification with the lie recipient, $F(1, 144) = .04$, $p = .84$. However, when the person doing the lying was an ingroup member and the lie recipient was an ingroup member, the univariate test indicated that there was significantly more moral derogation of the lie when it resulted in positive consequences ($M = 5.59$, $S.D. = 0.67$) than when it resulted in negative consequences ($M = 4.97$, $S.D. = 1.03$), $F(1, 144) = 5.31$, $p < .05$. The pattern of results was not consistent across the three dependent variables in this case. Only moral derogation of the lie itself was significantly impacted.

Discussion

The results of this experiment were far from consistent with predictions. The a priori predictions were for a three-way interaction, but in the opposite direction than that evidenced by the data. It was predicted that participants would be harder on an outgroup member lying to an ingroup member in the negative consequences condition.

The actual results of this experiment contradicted predictions in primarily four ways. First, the ingroup / outgroup manipulation check did not result in a significant main effect. Participants were not more likely to identify with a character with an American name than an Arab name. On first inspection, this result might be interpreted as meaning that the experiment protocol was simply flawed. A character in a vignette with an Arab name will not necessarily be perceived as an outgroup member. However, the presence of the three-way interaction suggests that the explanation for these results is not so simple. Participants were less likely to identify with the character with the Arab name, but only under certain circumstances.

The second deviation from the predicted pattern of results was that participants' moral perceptions were more variable when the liar was an ingroup member. The original prediction was for harder penalties for an outgroup liar, and predictions were not formalized for a two-way interaction for an ingroup member. To understand how extreme a deviation from predictions these results are, it is interesting to discuss these results within the context of a theoretical distinction made by Brewer and Brown (1998). They conceptualize bias resulting

from intergroup distinctions into three categories. First, favoritism of the ingroup results from ingroup formation in which individuals show a bias towards allocating resources and positive characteristics to ingroup members. This is contrasted with the second category of outgroup differentiation in which outgroup members are derogated. Finally, in intergroup social competition, the ingroup works towards establishing and maintaining superiority over the outgroup. Brewer and Brown (1998) cite a growing body of literature suggesting that phenomena and cognitive processes associated with each of these three categories are independent processes. In other words, ingroup favoritism is not always necessarily associated with outgroup derogation.

In regards to the data at hand, the original predictions emphasized outgroup differentiation and derogation. It was hypothesized that individuals would be more likely to morally derogate outgroup members. However, the actual results suggest that it is an ingroup member who is more likely to be morally condemned. These results fail to support the original hypotheses about intergroup dynamics, and instead suggest processes regarding intragroup dynamics. In this case, rather than using moral derogation to highlight intergroup differences, moral derogation is used to punish an ingroup member. In this context, morality seems to be used to persuade ingroup members to conform to group norms or expectations.

These results are consistent with research on the black sheep effect (Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). This research tested hypotheses augmenting social identity

theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to suggest a theory in which ingroup favoritism is actually subsumed within a tendency to judge ingroup members more extremely than outgroup members. Ingroup favoritism results from extreme judgments of favorable ingroup members, but they go on to demonstrate that unfavorable ingroup members are judged more extremely in the opposite direction. Unfavorable ingroup members receive more negative evaluations than unfavorable outgroup members. An overall positive social identity is maintained through derogation of unfavorable ingroup members.

More recent research conducted by Biernat, Vescio, and Billings (1999) suggests that this black sheep effect is a reaction towards expectancy violations. Consistent with the explanation that the black sheep effect is a result of a motivation to maintain a positive social identity, ingroup members are expected to be favorable in nature, so when presented with an unfavorable ingroup member, expectancies are violated resulting in negative affective responses.

The present results are consistent with this expectancy violation explanation of the black sheep effect when one considers the third departure from predictions. That is, an ingroup member was more morally derogated when the recipient of the lie was an outgroup member and the lie resulted in negative consequences. It seems that moral derogation was used to punish an ingroup member for indiscretion resulting in negative consequences for an outgroup member. In this instance, there was greater moral derogation of the lie, greater moral derogation of the liar, and greater identification with the lie recipient. How is this a violation of expectations? Mummendey et al. (1992) demonstrated that

in minimal group conditions, allocation of positive resources is biased in favor of the ingroup, but individuals are <u>not</u> more likely to allocate negative consequences to outgroup members. This is exactly the condition under which an ingroup member received the most moral derogation in the present research – when an outgroup member experiences negative consequences as a result of an ingroup member's behavior. It may be that this is a violation of expected or approved ingroup behavior resulting in derogation intended to encourage the offending ingroup member to conform to group norms or expectations.

The last deviation from predictions was in regard to reactions to an ingroup member lying to an ingroup member. In this situation, it was <u>positive</u> consequences that received more moral derogation of the lie itself. Interestingly, this is the one case in which the three dependent variables did not respond in the same manner. Moral derogation of the liar and identification with the lie recipient did not exhibit significant differences between positive and negative consequences. One possible explanation for this pattern of results is that when an ingroup member transgresses against an ingroup member, it is under positive consequences that individuals derogate the behavior because of its violation of moral principles. Negative consequences may focus individuals' attention on the consequences themselves, but with positive consequences, attention may be focused on whether moral principles are upheld. On the other hand, these results may not be all that reliable. Future replication will indicate how reliable this pattern of results is.

CHAPTER FIVE

EXPERIMENT FOUR:

MORALITY AS AN INDICATOR OF INTERGROUP DISTINCTIVENESS

This experiment tests the prediction that morality serves as an indicator of intergroup distinctiveness. While Experiment 3 tests whether morality is differentially applied to ingroup and outgroup members, the last two experiments extend this research to test whether morality is used as a social indicator to emphasize group distinctiveness and group membership. Moral derogation may be differentially applied to the ingroup and outgroup and used to communicate group allegiance.

The rationale underlying this prediction is based on research on ingroup favoritism. Researchers have long commented on the fact that individuals tend to attribute positive characteristics to the ingroup rather than the outgroup (e.g., Allport, 1954; Sumner, 1906). Brewer (1999) suggests that "At its most basic level, the apparent universal preference for ingroups and ingroup ways over those of the outgroup stems from the simple observation that one can expect to be treated more nicely by ingroup members than by outgroups" (p. 435; also see Condon & Crano, 1988).

One possibility is that moral derogation is used to communicate differences in status. An individual can use moral derogation to induce and legitimize feelings of superiority over an outgroup member (Sidanius, 1993). When witnessing moral derogation, individuals are predicted to be more likely to

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perceive distinctions in group membership because ingroup members would not be expected to morally derogate one another.

Taking this argument another step would suggest that, whereas various cultures and religions have differences in moral viewpoints (Turiel, 1983), it may be that these groups are motivated to maintain these differences and avoid intergroup agreement. Consistent with Brewer's (1999) statement that, "there should be psychological mechanisms at the individual level that motivate and sustain ingroup identification and differentiation" (p. 434), it may be that differences in moral perspectives are needed to maintain intergroup distinctiveness ensuring that ingroup members will receive the positive benefits associated with ingroup membership. Without clear differences in moral viewpoints, it would be difficult to justify ingroup favoritism in the allocation of positive benefits associated with membership (Brewer, 1999).

Rather than being based on a foundation of objectivity, biases in the application of moral derogation suggest that moral judgment may play a role similar to stereotypes and discrimination in justifying existing intergroup distinctions (Sidanias & Pratto, 1999). Arguments that justify action based on moral judgments are weakened by the possibility that morality has been arbitrarily applied. For example, laws and societal opinion regarding issues such as prostitution and drugs ostensibly justified by morals and virtue (Friedman, 1993) may be veiled strategies for maintaining the existing social hierarchies and distinctions between the disadvantaged and the advantaged (Sidanius, 1993).

This argument would suggest that moral derogation has implications both for actors within a social interaction and for outsiders observing the interaction. If moral derogation is used to indicate group allegiance, then moral derogation should also affect the perceptions of an outside observer. To test this hypothesis, participants read a passage in which one character morally derogated another. If moral derogation is used to maintain group distinctiveness, then participants who read about a character who is morally derogated by another character will be more likely to perceive the two characters as belonging to separate groups.

Methods

Participants consisted of 61 college students recruited from local colleges and awarded extra-credit for participation. Participants were invited to participate in a study of moral attitudes and opinions, anonymity was assured, and participation was completely voluntary.

Design

In this experiment, there was one independent variable with three groups. The independent variable was the type of derogation expressed in the magazine article. The derogation was expressed by describing the character as 'irresponsible' in the non-moral derogation condition, and there were two conditions which utilized moral derogation by describing the character as either 'immoral' or 'unethical.' There were three dependent variables: perceptions of group membership, perceptions of the extremity of the derogation, and perceptions of superiority.

<u>Materials</u>

Participants were given the following instructions: "Please read the following excerpt from a magazine article. After you have finished reading the passage, you will be asked questions regarding the political viewpoint of the author of the article." Then they read the following passage:

As a part of his recent political campaign, Michael Littman

circulated information suggesting that his opponent had accepted

illegal campaign funds. This misrepresentation is clearly

[immoral/unethical/irresponsible]. To act in this way demonstrates

clear deficiency when it comes to [morality/ethics/politics]. We

need to send a clear message to Michael Littman that we do not

[morally/ethically/politically] approve of this campaign strategy.

Participants were randomly assigned into one of three conditions to read one of the words presented in brackets.

After they read the passage, participants answered questions on 7-point Likert scales designed to elicit perceptions of differences in group membership (see Appendix 2 for the complete questionnaire). One item ("To what extent do you believe that the author's disapproval is morally motivated?") was included as a manipulation check. Three items ("Do you think that the author belongs to the same political party as the candidate," "In general, do you think the author and candidate are similar on other political issues," and "On what percentage of political issues do you think the author would agree with the candidate") were included to measure perceived differences in group membership, $\alpha = .63$.

A potential criticism might be that the passage with references to morality is perceived as more critical than the passage without moral references. Two items ("Was the author too harsh on the candidate," and "Was the author too critical of the candidate") were included to test this alternative explanation, α = .56.

It is argued that moral derogation results in perceptions of distinctiveness in group membership because moral derogation communicates and legitimizes ingroup superiority over the outgroup. Because ingroup members are more likely to legitimize superiority over outgroup members, participants are predicted to interpret expressions of superiority as occurring between members of different groups. It is predicted that it is the communication of superiority that mediates the relationship between moral derogation and perceptions of intergroup distinctiveness. To test this mediating relationship, three items ("Do you think the author is intellectually superior to the candidate," "Do you think the author would make a better candidate," and "Do you think the author is a nicer person than the candidate") were included to measure perceptions of superiority, α = .84.

Results

First, the manipulation check indicated significant differences across the three conditions in perceptions of whether "the author's disapproval is morally motivated," $F_{(2, 58)}$ = 3.41, p < .05. The passage describing the behavior as 'unethical' was perceived as the most morally motivated (M = 5.41, S.D. = 1.50), and the passage describing the behavior as immoral (M = 4.40, S.D. = 1.60) received ratings similar to the passage describing it as irresponsible (M = 4.26,

S.D. = 1.56). A multivariate test comparing the three conditions across the three dependent variables of perceived difference in ingroup membership, perceptions of whether there were differences in criticalness, and perceptions of superiority indicate no significant differences, $F(14, 106) = 1.08$, $p = .39$. None of the univariate tests were significant, and reducing the analysis to pairwise comparisons between the various conditions did not uncover any significant results. Correlational analyses indicated that perceptions of whether the author's disapproval was morally motivated was not significantly associated with perceptions of group differences, $r(60) = -.02$, $p = .87$, perceptions of criticalness, $r(60) = .16$, $p = .23$, or perceptions of superiority, $r(60) = .10$, $p = .43$.

Discussion

These results failed to support a priori predictions that moral judgment would act as a social indicator of group membership. In spite of significant differences in perceptions of whether the author's disapproval was morally motivated, there were not significant differences in perceptions of group membership, significant differences in perceptions of criticalness, or significant differences in perceptions of superiority. Correlational analyses indicated similar conclusions in which there were not significant associations between perceptions of moral disapproval and any of the three dependent variables.

One possible explanation for these results is that the research protocol was flawed. Maybe these materials did not act as an adequate manipulation of moral disapproval. This explanation is weakened in light of significant differences in perceptions of moral disapproval. So, while there was enough

power within the research design to detect significant differences in perceptions of moral disapproval between the experimental conditions, the pattern did not completely fit with a priori predictions, and this same degree of power did not detect significant differences in the dependent variables. The largest effect size for these non-significant dependent variables was for perceptions of superiority with an f of 0.20, which would have required a total sample size of 390 participants for a 95% level of power or 246 participants for an 80% level of power. The effect size for perceptions of group differences was an f of .12, which would have required a total sample size of 1077 for 95% power or 675 participants for 80% power. This seems to suggest that, if moral disapproval is used as an indicator of group membership or intergroup distinctiveness, the effect is rather small.

It seems likely that the initial predictions were wrong. In light of the results from Experiment 3 suggesting that moral derogation was used to derogate an ingroup member violating norms and expectations, it seems that moral derogation appears to act within an intragroup capacity rather than in delineating intergroup distinctions. It is possible that moral derogation is not used for maintaining ingroup superiority or distinctiveness.

CHAPTER SIX

EXPERIMENT FIVE:

DEROGATION AS DISCREDITING AN ALTERNATIVE MORAL VIEWPOINT

Experiment 5 was originally intended to serve as an additional test of the prediction that moral judgment or derogation is used to maintain superiority of the ingroup. While some researchers have suggested that positive group identity is maintained primarily through ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup derogation (Mummendey et al., 1992), it is clear that there are certain situations in which outgroup derogation is used to reinforce ingroup superiority (Brewer, 1999).

For example, terror management theory more closely links personal self-esteem and the derogation of alternative worldviews. More specifically, terror management theory suggests that humans' awareness of their own impending death results in terror. Consequently, psychological and social constructs are maintained to manage this terror.

From this perspective, one of the most important functions of cultural worldview – humanly created and transmitted beliefs about the nature of reality shared by groups of individuals – is to assuage the anxiety engendered by the uniquely human awareness of vulnerability and death. Cultural worldview ameliorate anxiety by imbuing the universe with order and meaning, by providing standards of value that are derived from that meaningful conception of reality, and by promising protection and death transcendence to

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those who meet those standards of value. (p. 65, Greenberg,

Solomon, & Pyszczumski, 1997)

A common method of testing this theory is to remind participants of their

mortality (mortality salience) and then measure outgroup derogation. Research

within this paradigm has already linked mortality salience with moral derogation

of outgroup members. Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Lyon

(1989) demonstrated that municipal court judges set higher bonds for prostitutes

when their own mortality was salient. These findings were replicated by

Ochsmann and Reichelt (1994; cited in Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczumski,

1997) in the context of other moral transgressions. In their German sample,

however, prostitution was not perceived as immoral, and the mortality salience

manipulation did not affect judgments of prostitution. In another study (Study 1;

Greenberg et al., 1990), mortality salience in Christians resulted in ingroup

favoritism towards fellow Christians and outgroup derogation of Jews.

This experiment tests the hypothesis that moral derogation is used to

maintain perceptions of superiority of the ingroup by discrediting alternative

viewpoints. Just as in terror management theory, it was predicted that alternative

viewpoints would be threatening to ingroup superiority, and moral derogation

would be used to reaffirm this superiority. To test this hypothesis, half the

participants was presented a moral argument contrary to their own viewpoint,

and the other half was presented a moral argument consistent with their own

viewpoint. All participants were given an opportunity to morally derogate the

argument itself and to critique the author's writing skills. In each condition, half

the participants were given the opportunity to morally derogate first and then critique the author, and for the other half, the order was reversed. If moral derogation is used to discredit alternative viewpoints, then moral derogation should not occur if participants were already given an opportunity to discredit the argument by critiquing the author. This is a novel prediction in that it suggests that a critique unrelated to morality will result in less moral disapproval. If moral derogation is objectively applied to any morally questionable position, then this predicted result should not be found. The alternative prediction would be that any time an individual is confronted with a morally deficient argument, moral derogation will be used. According to this prediction, moral derogation should not be affected by previous opportunities to discredit an alternative moral viewpoint.

Methods

Participants consisted of 82 college students who received extra-credit for participation. Participants were invited to participate in a study examining moral attitudes and opinions. Participation was completely voluntary and anonymous.

Design

This experiment consisted of a 2 (controversial article vs. non-controversial article) x 2 (moral derogation first vs. non-moral derogation first) design. There were two dependent variables: moral derogation and non-moral critique.

<u>Materials</u>

Participants were asked to read one of two articles. One article contained controversial moral content intended to elicit moral derogation, and the second article contained non-controversial moral content (see Appendix 3 for the full questionnaire and for the text of the two articles). The controversial article (Mirkin, 1999) argued that the criminalization and immorality associated with pedophilia is a social construction, and to support this argument, the author provided illustrations of cultures in which sexual contact is accepted and expected between adults and children. The non-controversial article reported on the scandal surrounding the recent article in the <u>Psychological Bulletin</u> suggesting that child abuse has negligible long-term effects on the victims (Hogenson, 1999). This article basically argued that child abuse is morally reprehensible and argued against the normalization of pedophilia. It was predicted that college students would be more likely to agree with Hogenson's (1999) viewpoint than the viewpoint expressed by the Mirkin (1999) article.

After participants read their perspective articles, half of the respondents received four questions regarding the moral character of the author followed by five questions in which the participants were given the opportunity to criticize the author's writing ability. For the other half of the respondents, this order was reversed.

<u>Results</u>

First, an examination of the manipulation check indicated that participants were more likely to agree with the article intended to be morally non-controversial

($\underline{M}$ = 4.47, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 1.91) than the article intended to be morally controversial ($\underline{M}$ = 3.14, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 1.82), $\underline{F}$(1, 78) = 10.11, $\underline{p}$ < .01.

There were two independent variables. The first was whether participants read the controversial vs. non-controversial article, and the second was whether participants were given an opportunity to morally derogate the author of the article vs. derogate the author through non-moral means. The primary prediction was an interaction such that individuals who read the controversial article were predicted to morally derogate the author less after having had the opportunity to discredit the author by critiquing his writing ability. A multivariate test of the predicted interaction for the two dependent variables (non-moral critique and moral derogation) was not significant, $\underline{F}$(2, 79) = .76, $\underline{p}$ = .47, and neither of the univariate tests were significant.

In terms of main effects, however, an interesting pattern emerged. There was not a significant difference in moral derogation of the two articles, $\underline{F}$(1, 80) = 2.20, $\underline{p}$ = .14, but participants gave higher grades (based on a five point scale including A, B, C, D, and F) to the non-controversial article ($\underline{M}$ = 2.81, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 0.85) than to the controversial article ($\underline{M}$ = 2.44, $\underline{S.D.}$ = 0.79), $\underline{F}$(1, 80) = 4.15, $\underline{p}$ < .05. But, it may be that the non-controversial article truly was written better. Covarying agreement with the article did not account for this effect; there were still significant differences between articles in non-moral critique ratings, $\underline{F}$(1, 77) = 4.86, $\underline{p}$ < .05. This suggests that disagreement with the article did not account for the lower ratings of the controversial article.

Discussion

It is not clear whether the present experiment acted as an adequate test of the hypotheses. The predicted interaction was not significant, while the manipulation check indicated that participants were more likely to disagree with the article intended to be controversial in comparison with the article intended to be non-controversial. However, the central hypothesis was that an opportunity to discredit the author of the controversial article through non-moral means would result in less moral disapproval than for participants who read the controversial article but were not given an opportunity to discredit the author through non-moral means. While analyses were not consistent with this prediction, the pattern of results that should have emerged to discredit these analyses should have been increased moral derogation for the controversial article regardless of whether participants were given an opportunity to discredit the author through non-moral means. Analyses did not confirm this pattern of results, either.

Experiments 3 and 4 failed to provide evidence for the contention that moral derogation is used for maintaining ingroup moral superiority. Perceptions of moral disapproval did not result in greater perceptions of superiority in Experiment 4, and an opportunity to derogate a morally controversial article in a non-moral critique did not reduce the amount of moral derogation in Experiment 5. It may be that the materials used in these experiments were flawed, or it may be that, in light of Experiment 3's results, moral derogation serves a role within intragroup dynamics rather than intergroup dynamics.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GENERAL DISCUSSION

This dissertation research was intended to shed light on the social psychology of moral judgment. Originally, the first set of experiments were designed to test the role of situational factors such as consequences and social norms in influencing moral judgment, and the second set of experiments was designed to test hypotheses regarding moral judgment within the context of intergroup dynamics. However, these experiments did not support all of the original predictions. While the first set of experiments demonstrated that the consequences of a behavior will influence moral judgment of that behavior and moral norms influence moral beliefs, the second set of experiments failed to provide evidence that moral judgment is used within intergroup dynamics.

In hindsight, these experiments provide more evidence for the role of moral judgment in intragroup social influence than was originally predicted. Experiment 2 indicates that moral norms can influence moral beliefs. An individual revises moral beliefs to more closely conform to the group's perceived moral norm presumably to maintain identification with the ingroup, exaggerate similarity with the ingroup, and avoid the negative repercussions associated with deviance. As in Experiment 3, ingroup members morally derogate other ingroup members failing to act in consistency with norms and expectations. While the present research does not permit conclusions regarding whether these negative repercussions associated with failing to live up to the group's moral norms effectively influence future conformity, Experiment 1 indicates that negative

consequences can affect moral judgment. Future research will be able to further explore the processes of moral judgment in social influence and the strategies used by groups to encourage conformity to moral norms.

Moral Judgment in Intergroup Dynamics

While the present research did not necessarily disprove the idea that moral judgment is used within the context of intergroup dynamics, these experiments failed to support the hypotheses that moral judgment is used as an indicator of intergroup distinctiveness and ingroup superiority. In Experiment 4, moral disapproval was not significantly associated with perceptions of differences in group membership, perceptions of criticalness, or perceptions of superiority. In Experiment 5, it was reasoned that if moral derogation were used to maintain ingroup superiority, that individuals given an opportunity to establish superiority through alternative means would not need to use moral derogation. However, participants given the opportunity to discredit a morally controversial article with which they disagreed were not less likely to use moral derogation. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear whether these results indicate that the initial hypotheses were false or whether these results were a consequence of flawed methodology.

This leaves a number of possible explanations for the role of moral judgment. Moral judgment may be used within groups to induce conformity to moral norms and expectations; moral judgment still may be used to maintain intergroup distinctiveness and ingroup superiority, or moral judgment may be used for both of these purposes. The one experiment presented which provides a possible test of these three possibilities is Experiment 3. If moral judgment

were used to maintain intergroup relations to demarcate group membership and ingroup superiority, moral derogation should have been greater for outgroup members who inflicted negative consequences upon an ingroup member. If moral judgment were used to maintain ingroup conformity to norms, there should be more moral derogation expressed towards ingroup members violating these norms. The results of Experiment 3 support this second explanation and fail to provide evidence for the first.

There were not any significant differences in moral derogation toward outgroup members, but there were toward ingroup members. Ingroup members whose behavior resulted in negative consequences for an outgroup member received more moral derogation than in the positive consequence condition. It is possible that the target of the moral derogation violated the expectation or norm that it is inappropriate to take advantage of an outgroup member. In the context of Mummendey et al.'s (1992) research, it is acceptable to preferentially allocate positive resources to the ingroup, but it is not acceptable to preferentially allocate negative consequences to the outgroup. This violation of ingroup expectancies elicited a black sheep effect in which the offending ingroup member was morally derogated.

Individual Differences in the Application of Moral Judgment

Future research will be able to explore the role of individual differences in affecting moral judgment within both intergroup dynamics and within intragroup social influence. In regards to intergroup dynamics, Brewer and Brown (1998) review the body of research indicating that some individuals are more likely to

utilize stereotypes and discriminate within an intergroup context. Likewise, it is possible that there are individual differences in the tendency to apply moral derogation. These experiments' failure to provide evidence for the role of moral derogation in an intergroup context may be a result of excluding individual difference considerations. For example, individuals who are more strongly identified with religious groups or individuals with a more conservative political viewpoint may be more likely to use moral derogation to distinguish group membership.

Similarly, individual differences may affect moral derogation in intragroup social influence. Individual differences may impact the likelihood to express moral derogation of an ingroup member violating expectations, and the effectiveness of moral derogation for affecting social influence also may be impacted by characteristics of the targets of moral derogation. Religious or politically conservative individuals may be more (or less) likely to modify behavior in the face of moral disapproval. Just as it has been demonstrated that conservative individuals are more likely to exhibit discrimination and racism (e.g., Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996), more conservative individuals also may utilize moral judgment in intergroup contexts. The possibility of a relationship between political ideology and the use of moral judgment seems plausible in light of research demonstrating a relationship between moral development and political activism (Fishkin, Keniston, & Mackinnon, 1973).

One unfortunate oversight in the present research was in regards to collecting data on gender differences. While it is not entirely clear how sex

differences will impact the use and impact of moral derogation, data should have been collected on sex in order to explore these relationships. Previous theory and research suggest that sex may play an important role in moral development. Gilligan (1982) provides a theory refuting or reconceptualizing Kohlberg's (1968/1980) theory of moral development to include considerations of sex differences. It is not entirely clear what implications this perspective has for the present research. If anything, it may be that females are actually more likely to utilize and be influenced by moral judgment within social influence, because within Gilligan's (1982) perspective, females' utilization of moral judgment is supposed to place greater emphasis on interpersonal considerations. In addition, Khan and Lambert (1998) indicate that the black sheep effect was more exaggerated in females in comparison with males. Future research will definitely need to continue exploring the relationship between sex differences and moral judgment.

Cognitive Processes Involving Moral Judgment

This research also makes suggestions regarding the cognitive processes involving moral judgment. Bandura's (1990) theory of moral disengagement suggests that individuals sometimes disengage or fail to associate specific behaviors with corresponding moral beliefs. The research presented in Experiments 1 and 2 provide further support that individuals are capable of maintaining cognitive representations of moral judgment for specific instances separate from cognitive representations of corresponding moral beliefs. A manipulation of the consequences of a specific instance of lying affected

judgments of that specific instance but did not influence the corresponding

general moral belief or moral judgment of lying, in general. Likewise, a

manipulation of moral norms influenced participants general moral beliefs

regarding lying but did not impact moral judgments of a specific instance of lying.

It is possible that the ability to maintain a separation between specific

moral behavior and the corresponding general moral beliefs protects one from

the negative psychological distress associated with recognizing these

inconsistencies. Likewise, within the context of Batson and colleagues' (Batson,

Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson,

Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999) conceptualization of moral hypocrisy,

individuals are able to appear moral while avoiding the cost of actually being

moral.

Mischel and Mischel (1976) observe that:

"History is replete with atrocities that were justified by involving the

highest principles and that were perpetrated upon victims who were

equally convinced of their own moral principles. In the name of

justice, of the common welfare, of universal ethics, and of God,

millions of people have been killed and whole cultures destroyed.

In recent history, concepts of universal right, quality, freedom, and

social equity have been used to justify every variety of murder

including genocide." (p. 107)

It may be that these seeming contradictions are actually consistent with more

complex moral principles permitting traditionally immoral behavior in the defense

of other higher-order moral or religious principles, or it may be that a lack of

association between mental representations of abstract moral principles to

specific behavioral instances is not that uncommon.

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Appendix 1: Vignette for Chapter 5

PALO ALTA, CA. Michael Wilks, a local businessman, filed charges against Anzhem Ahred claiming fraud. In a recent business deal, Ahred sold Wilks a three store 7-Eleven franchise. To insure the sale, Ahred assured Wilks that the businesses were located in an area with little crime. Subsequently, a deal was made, and Wilks invested his life savings in purchasing the businesses.

Over the next few months, Wilks found out that the area was high in crime. There were numerous muggings and carjackings that occurred in the vicinity of his stores some taking place on the very properties he had purchased.

Although the business has been extremely successful, Wilks has pressed charges citing Ahred's misrepresentation. He cited evidence indicating that Ahred knowingly misrepresented the facts. On numerous occasions, Ahred had contacted the police complaining about burglaries, vandalism, and gang activity in the area surrounding the businesses.

Questions

1) Ahred told Wilks that the businesses were located in an area with little crime. Do you consider this a lie?

Definitely   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Definitely

Not

For each of the following statements, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree.

2) Ahred did the morally right thing.

Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Disagree

3) It was alright for Ahred to misrepresent the prevalence of crime.

Definitely   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Definitely

Not

4) Ahred is a morally good person.

Agree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Disagree

5) Ahred is a moral person.

Good   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Bad

6) Only a morally bad person could have done that.

Disagree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Agree

7) How similar are you to Ahred?
8) How likely is it that you would socialize with Ahred?
9) How much sympathy do you feel towards Ahred?
10) How similar are you to Wilks?
11) How likely is it that you would socialize with Wilks?
12) How much sympathy do you feel towards Wilks?

Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following sentences.

13) Lying is always bad.

Disagree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Agree

14) There are times when lying is justified.

Disagree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Agree

15) People should never lie.

Disagree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Agree

Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Chapter 7

Please read the following newspaper article.

LITTLE ROCK, AK. As a part of his recent political campaign, Zachary Littman circulated information suggesting that his opponent had accepted illegal campaign funds. Subsequently, evidence surfaced demonstrating that Littman purposefully and knowingly misrepresented the facts to fabricate his accusation.

In a letter to the editor, Mark Chrysler was quoted saying "This misrepresentation is clearly unethical. To act in this way demonstrated clear deficiency when it comes to ethics. We need to send a clear message to Michael Littman that we do not ethically approve of this campaign strategy." Littman's campaign manager has refused to comment as to whether this development will impact the upcoming election.

For each of the following statements, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree.

1. Chrysler's disapproval is morally motivated.

Disagree						Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. Chrylser probably belongs to the same political party as Littman.

Disagree						Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

3. In general, Chrysler and Littman are similar on other political issues.

Disagree   Agree

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

4. On what percentage of political issues do you think Chrysler would agree with Littman?

0%			50%			100%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

5. Chrysler was very critical of Littman.

Disagree						Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

9. Chrysler was extreme in criticizing Littman.

Disagree						Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

10. Chrylser is intellectually superior to Littman.

Disagree						Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

11. Chrylser would make a better candidate.

Disagree						Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

12. Chrylser is a nicer person than Littman.

Disagree						Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

<u>Appendix 3: Questionnaire for Chapter 8</u>
Please read the following article. Once you have finished, you will be asked questions about the author.
[Insert Article Here]

How much do you agree with the author?

Disagree   Agree
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

[Moral Derogation Questions]
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

1. The author's article was morally responsible.

Disagree   Agree
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

2. The author's moral character is questionable.

Disagree   Agree
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

3. Morally, the author is completely right.

Disagree   Agree
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

4. The author is clearly lacking good morals.

Disagree   Agree
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

[Alternative Method for Discrediting the Author]
Now, please evaluate the author's writing style and ability. Evaluate each component on a scale from A to F.

1. Writing Style
    A   B   C   D   F

2. Argument Clarity
    A   B   C   D   F

3. Use of Supporting Evidence for the Argument
    A   B   C   D   F

4. Ability to Keep Reader Interested
   A   B   C   D   F

5. Overall Grade
   A   B   C   D   F

[Article with controversial moral content. Source: (Mirkin, 1999)]

Ideologies are at their strongest when their correctness is simply accepted, and treating existing ideological categories and divisions as though they are objectively right serves the interests of groups that are considered legitimate. When a core of deviant group members begin to identify with each other and reject the dominant culture's assessment of their worth, as some women did in the first and second waves of feminism, as blacks did the 1950s and '60s, and as gays and lesbians did in the late '60s and '70s, and as some pedophiles are doing now, the claim is made that the dominant categories are incorrect and changeable social creations. At this point there is a pre-debate. Dominant groups deny that there is anything to discuss, asserting that existing arrangements are self-evident and intuitively good, usually claiming that they reflect nature and a natural order. Dissenters are dismissed as "radical," "crazy," "evil," or "cult" figures. (p. 7)

This article will argue that, like homosexuality, the concept of child molestation is a culture and class specific modern creation. Though Americans consider intergenerational sex to be evil, it has been permissible or obligatory in many cultures and periods of history. Sex with male youths is especially widespread. Alternatives of "boy or woman" occur frequently in Greek and Roman literature. In early modern Japan men were expected to have sexual love with both youths and women. The male samurai lover was to be a model for the youth, and lovers of youths were considered to be even more virile than lovers of women. Many non-western cultures consider age-asymmetrical relationships to be a "transient and natural stage in the lives of both adults and youths." It is a duty, a part of the adult's job of educating children.

[Article with non-controversial moral content. Source: (Hogenson, 1999)]

There is a growing controversy regarding whether child sexual abuse is related to adult adjustment. The APA found itself at the center of a burgeoning controversy after publishing the report *A Meta-Analytic Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Using College Samples,* which concluded that child sexual abuse "does not cause intense harm on a pervasive basis," among victims.

The report has been criticized, and some have argued that it attempts to normalize pedophilia. One broadcaster also voiced strong opposition to the report's conclusions, which included renaming child sexual abuse "adult-child sex, a value-neutral term," according to a text of the document obtained by CNS.

In the present article, it is argued that this interpretation of the psychological literature is ethically irresponsible. Renaming child sexual abuse with a value-neutral term discards our social responsibility to safeguard our children against adult sexual abuse. In light of this controversy, the APA has reaffirmed its position by stating that "sexual abuse of children is wrong and harmful to its victims." The present article supports this viewpoint and argues against any action or policy that may normalize pedophilia.